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Oxfam’s Empower Youth for Work program commissioned the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) to conduct research on ‘The Future of Work’. IDS explored the expected 
changes in work and income-generating activities for young people in rural areas and 
whether existing policies anticipate the future of work? The research approaches the 
future of work according to four ‘megatrends’. The report shows the urgent need for 
policies that are fit for the future of work for rural youth, in the face of rapid changes in 
our technological, climate and political realities. 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Empower Youth for Work (EYW) is a five-year program (2016-2021) run by Oxfam, funded by the 
IKEA Foundation. The program focuses on enabling young people, especially young women, in 
climate change affected rural areas of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Ethiopia to seek and 
obtain decent work. Working with a wide range of stakeholders (including young people, government 
and the private sector), the program applies a holistic approach to tackle issues of economic 
empowerment, gender-based discrimination, youth agency and enabling policy and normative 
environments  – all of which affect young people’s opportunities for and choices about employment. 
The program activities promote climate-friendly practices and support young people and their 
communities in adapting to the effects of climate change.  
Oxfam has identified four ‘megatrends’ that are shaping the future, including rural youths’ future 
livelihoods. These are playing out in different ways across rural areas of the four EYW countries:  
1. Technological change  
2. Demographic change  
3. Environmental pressures  
4. Shifting power  
Without the right interventions, these trends risk increasing the inequalities young people already face 
– the economic and gender inequality that affect their life chances and the nature of work available to 
them.  
Policies addressing rural youth employment need holistic solutions; ‘one size fits all’ solutions don’t 
work. We ‘tested’ youth policies from the four EYW countries to assess whether they address the 
factors and trends affecting rural youth and anticipate the future of work. We found that they work well 
in terms of their overall approach and focus on the ‘enabling environment’. However, they anticipate 
the future of work in a limited fashion, with worryingly little attention to technological and 
environmental change.  
Addressing inequalities needs to be at the heart of policy making; there are limits to what can be 
achieved by focusing on education and employment without also addressing the underlying causes of 
young people’s unequal position in society. Given the threats to freedom of assembly and association 
from closing civic space and internet shutdowns, and the backlash against women’s rights worldwide, 
defending space for civil society and feminist activists is vital to empower and protect rural youth.  
Overall, it is crucial to ‘think youth, act structurally’: to act on a larger scale, society-wide, to lift 
everyone up. Youth are part of families and communities; policies to help rural youth therefore need to 
address the broader issues of a stable and habitable climate and decent jobs for all, not just for young 
people. This research shows the urgent need for policies that are fit for the future of work for rural 
youth, in the face of rapid changes in our technological, climate and political realities.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
Rural areas have historically lagged in development and employment outcomes, and are now at risk 
of being left further behind (UNDP 2016). Oxfam recently identified four ‘megatrends’ shaping the 
future: rapid technological change, demographic change, environmental pressures and shifting power 
(Artuso and Guijt 2020). These megatrends will also shape the future of work and income, and their 
impact risks increasing the inequalities already experienced by rural youth.  
 
• Technological change: Digitization is changing the world of work, and automation is 
closing down traditional paths to rural development such as labor-intensive manufacturing 
(IFAD 2019; World Bank 2019b). 
o People in rural areas in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are being left 
behind by poor infrastructure and the high costs of connection; they are 40% less 
likely to use mobile internet than the urban population. Overall, women are 18% less 
likely than men to use the internet (Bahia and Suardi 2019).  
• Demographic change: One out of every six people on the planet is aged 15 to 24, and most 
of these young people – almost one billion of them – live in developing countries. This ‘youth 
bulge’ can yield dividends, but only if the economy is strong enough to provide productive 
employment to young people (Ayele, Khan and Sumberg 2017). The number of youth is 
expected to increase to 1.3 billion by 2030 due to a rapid increase in the youth population in 
Africa, where fertility rates remain high (UNDESA 2019).  
o Over half of youth in developing countries live in rural areas: the number of youth 
is growing fastest in some of the world’s poorest countries, and particularly in rural 
areas within these countries. While the number of rural youth in Asia is expected to 
drop from 340 to 230 million by 2050, the number in Africa is expected to nearly 
double to 180 million (IFAD 2019). 
 
Table 1 Rural youth population and proportion for EYW countries 2018  
Country Total youth 
population (aged 15-
24) 
Rural youth 
population 
Proportion of rural 
youth population 
Bangladesh 30,778,000 21,000,000 68.2% 
Ethiopia 23,648,000 17,000,000 71.9% 
Indonesia 45,402,000 19,000,000 41.8% 
Pakistan 41,935,000 22,000,000 52.5% 
Total 141,764,000 79,000,000 55.7% 
(Source: IFAD 2019: 53; UNDESA 2019) 
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Table 2 Overall Youth population (aged 15-24) changes over time in EYW countries  
Location 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Bangladesh 26,641,000 29,513,000 30,824,000 28,856,000 27,163,000 24,271,000 
Ethiopia 12,872,000 17,493,000 24,723,000 28,672,000 33,776,000 36,687,000 
Indonesia 43,217,000 41,782,000 45,971,000 46,768,000 46,053,000 44,481,000 
Pakistan 27,408,000 37,234,000 42,748,000 48,193,000 54,704,000 55,237,000 
EYW countries 110,138,000 126,022,000 144,266,000 152,489,000 161,696,000 160,676,000 
World 1,085,432,000 1,215,717,000 1,209,584,000 1,293,876,000 1,332,242,000 1,338,497,000 
(Source: UNDESA 2019) 
 
• Environmental pressures: The frequency and intensity of climatic events such as floods, 
heatwaves, tropical cyclones and droughts are increasing globally due to climate change.  
o Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and 
supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes. The effects of climate 
change are expected to be felt especially strongly by rural youth, who mainly work in 
sectors such as agriculture that have been identified as vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change (IPCC et al. 2014).  
• Shifting power: NGOs face a challenging environment, where only 3% of the world’s 
population now live in countries with open civic space. This is highly likely to halt or reverse 
progress towards reducing inequality, since it is often marginalized and deprived groups 
whom civil society seeks to empower and protect (Hossain et al. 2019).  
o For the EYW countries this is particularly challenging. According to the CIVICUS 
ratings on civic space, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Bangladesh are classed as ‘repressed’ 
and Indonesia as ‘obstructed’ (CIVICUS 2020). 
Alongside these megatrends, extreme economic inequality and gendered inequalities impact on the 
life chances of young people and the nature of work available to them. As an Oxfam report on youth 
and inequality states:  
‘Market fundamentalism and political capture by elites are at the heart of extreme 
economic inequality and limit the life chances of millions of youth around the 
world in numerous ways. Economic inequality limits social mobility, or the 
prospects that over the course of a lifetime a young person will be able to work his 
or her way into a better economic situation.’ (Glassco and Holguin 2016) 
Youth are three times more likely to be unemployed than adults (IFAD 2019). Irregular work and a 
lack of formal employment and social protection leads to working poverty (i.e. where people live below 
the poverty line despite being in work), which affects as many as 169 million youth worldwide 
(International Labour Office 2015). In Africa alone, there are projected to be 450 million more people 
of working age in 2035 than there were in 2015 (Filmer and Fox 2014). But at the current rate, only 
one formal job is being created for every four African youth entering the workforce (African 
Development Bank Group 2016). 
The backlash against women’s rights and intractable gender relations affect the type of work that 
women can take on, the places where they can work and the gender-based violence they may 
experience at home and at work. Women’s heavy and unequal responsibility for care work 
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perpetuates gender and economic inequalities. Globally, unpaid care work carried out by women 
aged 15 and over is worth at least $10.8 trillion annually – three times the size of the tech industry 
(Coffey, Revollo, Harvey and Lawson 2020).  
Indigenous groups and ethnic minority groups in rural areas are further marginalized and at risk of 
being left behind, owing to overlapping experiences of exclusion and oppression (Burns et al. 2013). 
Indigenous rural youth tend to live in the least-connected areas with less access to public services 
and productive resources, and tend to have less access to education and fewer years of schooling 
than non-indigenous rural youth (IFAD 2019; World Bank 2018b). 
What is a rural area? 
Three things distinguish rural from urban areas: 
1. Abundant land and other natural resources.  
2. Significant distances between rural settlements and between these and cities, making the 
movement of goods costly.  
3. Lower incomes and a higher proportion of people living below specified poverty lines.  
Rural areas are not homogenous: there are significant differences between ‘peri-urban’ and 
‘remote’ areas, with a major impact on the enabling conditions for rural youth employment.  
(Wiggins and Proctor 2001) 
 
2.1 About this research 
Oxfam Novib commissioned the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) to conduct the research on 
‘The Future of Work’ as part of Oxfam’s Empower Youth for Work Program. We set out to answer the 
following questions, with a focus on LMICs in general and on the four EYW program countries in 
particular: 
1. What are the expected changes in work and income-generating activities for young 
people in rural areas? 
2. Do existing policies anticipate the future of work? 
To answer these questions, we carried out desk research, policy analysis and interviews. 
• Findings from a kick-off workshop with country teams provided valuable insights, framing 
and grounding for the research.  
• We undertook a desk review to analyze existing academic literature and evidence on the 
long-term future of work. This helped us to understand the changing nature of work and 
income in the Global South, and the opportunities and challenges faced by rural youth.  
• We conducted a policy analysis of relevant policies in the EYW countries to assess whether 
they are anticipating these changes. 
• We also carried out stakeholder interviews with representatives from academia, think tanks, 
the private sector and government in the four EYW countries.  
The very different political and economic landscapes of the EYW countries – Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Ethiopia – makes it challenging to offer ‘one size fits all’ answers, but it is hoped that 
the findings from this research provide valuable insights.  
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3 THE CHALLENGE OF RURAL 
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 
Rural youth lag behind their urban counterparts on key development indicators, including educational 
attainment (IFAD 2019) and inclusion in decision-making processes (Trivelli and Morel 2019). Young 
women in rural areas face additional challenges: there are fewer opportunities for formal employment 
overall in rural areas and social norms mean they are less likely to be employed in informal work.  
Employment opportunities for rural youth are impacted by the global megatrends explored above, and 
by factors at national, community, individual and household levels. These trends and factors overlap 
and affect the opportunities that are available to rural youth (Irwin, Mader and Flynn 2018; Sumberg, 
Chamberlin et al. 2019). All of these factors impact on inequalities. They shape the distribution of 
employment, vulnerability to climate change, income, productive assets, land, technology and agency. 
They also determine access to decent work, skilled employment opportunities, wage/stable 
employment and involvement in decision making. 
 
Figure 1 Drivers of inequality for rural youth 
Framework based on work by Glover and Hernandez (2016). 
 
 
3.1 National factors  
Existing policies and legal frameworks at a national level shape the rural youth employment 
landscape, but tackling youth unemployment and underemployment requires fiscal and institutional 
capacity, which is often lacking in the countries where these interventions are most needed. Rural 
youth may also be systematically disadvantaged by existing laws and policies. 
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The material wellbeing, employment opportunities, and the education, training and other support 
available to rural youth is largely determined by a country’s economic situation at the national level, in 
terms of growth in GDP as well as distribution of wealth. In countries with a high level of structural 
transformation, there may be more opportunities for youth to escape poverty through non-farm 
employment. The poorer the country, the higher the concentration of rural youth in the country. In 
countries that have low levels of formal/waged work opportunities even in urban areas, it is unlikely 
that these opportunities will be available in rural areas.  
Conflict and fragility often negatively affect the quantity and quality of jobs available and make it more 
difficult to carry out work. By conservative estimates, 350 million rural youth lived in conflict-affected 
countries in 2016 and almost one-third of all rural youth experienced conflict directly (Baliki et al. 
2019; IFAD 2019). Conflict and fragility are deterrents to private investments. Living in conflict-afflicted 
settings can make it even more difficult for rural youth to acquire the skills and knowledge needed to 
access decent work, both during and after the conflict. Rural young women in conflict settings often 
experience greater setbacks (IFAD 2019; Schindler and Brück 2011). 
3.1.1 Opportunities for rural youth 
Access to markets and the natural resource base also shape rural youths’ opportunities and 
challenges (IFAD 2019; Sumberg, Chamberlin et al. 2019). These vary by location; 67% of rural youth 
live in areas with high agroecological potential in terms of land, soil and climatic characteristics, but 
many of these areas have low commercial potential because they lack access to markets, while 24% 
of rural youth live in areas with both high agroecological potential AND high commercial potential 
(IFAD 2019). The level of transformation of rural economies can vary as much within countries as it 
does between them, making it all the more important that national policies do not treat all rural areas 
in the country as being the same. 
On average, 37% of rural youth work in agriculture. There seems to be a correlation between the level 
of development in a given country and the percentage of youth working in agriculture. Over 70% of 
rural youth work in agriculture in some low-income countries (OECD 2018), and this figure is higher 
than 50% in sub-Saharan Africa (Elder el al. 2015). In countries with a poorly performing economy, 
rural youth are unlikely to find work outside of low-paid, informal agricultural work, and so may choose 
to move to an urban area in search of employment.  
 
Nabeel Youcef, Radical Growth Solutions, Pakistan  
‘I know young people with even 10 acres of good land who chose instead to go to the city and 
get a job as a driver or home help. Agriculture is hard, unpredictable and precarious. Climate 
change is making it more unpredictable. Farmers get ripped off by middlemen. Young people 
prefer a reliable urban wage.’  
Young people tend to work at the lower end of the agricultural value chain, in lower-skilled activities 
like food production, rather than in off-farm agricultural sector jobs such as food processing and 
agricultural services (OECD 2018). Few value chain youth-integration programs seek to include youth 
in parts of the value chain associated with higher-skilled employment (OECD 2018). This means that 
youth are less likely to be employed in better-quality agricultural jobs like tractor driving, repairing 
agricultural machinery, providing agricultural services using information and communications 
technology (ICT), or food processing. 
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3.1.2 Informal and unregulated work 
Rural youth are stuck in insecure, low-quality, poorly paid work; they are challenged by under-
qualification and a lack of opportunities, especially in agriculture. Less than half (47%) of rural youth 
are employed in wage work, while the other half (49.4%) are either self-employed or ‘contributing 
family workers’, two types of work that are considered vulnerable employment (OECD 2018). Wage 
work is associated with higher earnings and better working conditions than informal work and self-
employment (Elder and Koné 2014). The availability of wage work is highly correlated with levels of 
economic transformation, so rural youth in low-income countries are less likely to be able to access 
such jobs. Male, more educated and older workers are more likely to engage in wage work than 
women, less educated and younger workers (Elder and Koné 2014; IFAD 2019).  
3.1.3 Social protection  
Social protection programs transfer income or assets to poor families, protect vulnerable people 
against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of marginalized groups (Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereux 2008). Social protection programs include interventions such as conditional 
cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers, in-kind transfers (e.g. food), social pensions, social 
insurance, universal health coverage, public works programs and employment guarantee schemes 
(Sumberg, Szyp et al. 2019). A range of social protection programs in developing countries aim to 
support early steps in young people’s livelihood-building and employment processes (Sumberg, Szyp 
et al. 2019). These are described below. 
• Cash transfer programs: These are typically aimed at addressing food insecurity or poverty 
within households. Young people can benefit from these programs through improved educational 
outcomes, as many conditional cash transfer programs especially aim to increase these 
outcomes among children and youth within beneficiary households. Young people may also be 
the direct recipients of cash transfers as young and/or poor heads of households. These 
programs can be effective in reducing poverty and even tackling inequality; a well-known 
example is the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil, which helped to bring more than 29 million people 
out of poverty between 2003 and 2014 (Sánchez-Ancochea and Mattei 2011; World Bank 
2019d). 
• Social pensions: These are typically accrued by older members of society and of family or 
household units, and thus can usually only benefit young people indirectly. However, studies from 
South Africa and elsewhere have found that a young person living in a beneficiary household can 
still benefit from these programs via increased household expenditure and/or investment in its 
members, resulting in better health, increased food consumption, increased motivation (including 
to work or find work), and potentially increased access to capital to start or expand a self-
employment activity or to migrate for work (see also SALDRU 2013; Veras Soares and Robino 
2015). 
• Public works programs: These can be particularly relevant and directly or indirectly beneficial to 
rural youth as they can have the effect of stabilizing income and consumption, especially if they 
are offered off-season when demand for agricultural labor is low. 
• Social insurance programs: Like social pensions, these are most likely to indirectly benefit 
young people, especially in rural areas, as they are normally financed by contributions from 
formal employees and employers. Rural young people, who have very little involvement in formal 
employment, are only likely to benefit indirectly through payments made to the head of household 
or other senior members of the household, though formal employment in rural areas is typically 
rare across developing countries.  
• Universal health coverage: This is very likely to benefit rural young people directly, as it will 
mean they have more finances to spend on establishing or expanding a self-employment activity 
– including being able to take more risks with investments, looking for or migrating for work, and 
participating in education or training to better prepare them for the labor market. They may also 
benefit indirectly from the increased income at the disposal of the household head or senior 
members of the household. 
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Programs which are most likely to directly benefit rural young people, who are mainly informally 
employed (or unemployed), are ‘social assistance’ or ‘safety net’ programs, which are normally tax-
financed and thus of no direct cost to young people (these include public works programs, universal 
health coverage, cash transfers, etc.) (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). 
Finally, universal basic income (UBI) involves paying an unconditional sum to every citizen, 
irrespective of their work status, as a form of social protection. Various UBI pilots have been carried 
out by governments and donor organizations over the last decade including in India, Finland and 
Namibia (Standing 2015). As UBI is paid to all citizens regardless of work status, it ends up 
channeling a lot of money to people who are already well off. Some therefore argue that a more 
effective and equitable means of providing social security is the provision of universal basic services 
(UBS) (Portes, Reed and Percy 2017). The objective of UBS is to extend public provision of education 
and healthcare, shelter and food, and even transport and connectivity, to all citizens. This system is 
designed to enable all citizens to access the basic necessities for full participation in a modern 
economy. UBI and UBS are not mutually exclusive and can be complementary. 
 
Social protection programs in EYW countries 
Bangladesh: While the number of programs nearly tripled between 2008-09 and 2014-15, from 
56 to 152, spending on social protection programs has remained constant at around 2% of GDP 
over the last decade (representing more than a doubling of actual spending). With regard to 
‘safety nets’ (which include poverty-targeted cash transfers, public works programs, etc.), which 
are the most common social protection interventions in Bangladesh, there were 140 such 
programs in 2014-15, representing 1.4% of GDP. This is comparatively high for the South Asia 
region, but still low across developing countries more broadly (average of 1.6%). The nine 
largest safety net programs represented 46% of expenditures in 2014-15, including a cash-
based public works program (Employment Generation Program for the Poorest – EGPP). Cash 
transfer and public works programs have clear target groups relying on pro-poor (self-) targeting, 
while food-based relief programs have less clear target groups (World Bank 2016b). 
Some of these programs target primary schoolchildren and female secondary schoolchildren, 
while also mainly targeting the ‘categorically poor’ (people without land ownership and family 
income, and those from certain backgrounds). Young rural household heads are likely to have 
benefited from the programming targeting the ‘categorically poor’, including the EGPP, which 
provides 40 days of work (at rates higher than local minimum wages), twice a year, to household 
heads who otherwise work as ‘day laborers’ and who have less than 0.5 acres of land. There is a 
requirement for one-third of EGPP beneficiaries to be women, which has led to higher female 
participation than in other public works programs. 
 
Ethiopia: The National Social Protection Policy was enacted in 2016, with five priority areas: 1) 
social safety nets; 2) livelihood and employment schemes; 3) social insurance; 4) addressing 
inequalities in access to basic services; and 5) providing legal protection and support to victims 
of exploitation and abuse. The government has pledged to invest 2-3% of GDP to social 
protection. 
The largest social protection program in Ethiopia (and the one most relevant to rural youth 
employment) is the ‘Productive Safety Net Program’ (PSNP), which supports eight million people 
(just below 8% of the population). The PSNP has three aims: 1) ‘consumption smoothing’ during 
the hunger season; 2) protecting household assets from depletion due to chronic food insecurity 
or hunger; and 3) providing community assets through a public works program. The PSNP’s 
components include: 1) participation in public works to develop community assets (e.g. roads, 
ponds), requiring the services of at least one able-bodied person in the household, in return 
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receiving food or cash transfers for up to six months per year; 2) conditional credit (if 
beneficiaries demonstrate an ability to save beforehand) to invest in income-generating activities 
of their choice; and 3) direct transfers throughout the year to non-able-bodied participants. 
Other programs are also being piloted, including in certain regions, such as a cash transfer 
program in Tigray and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPRS), and 
weather insurance, school feeding programs, etc. (Lemma and Cochrane 2019). 
 
Indonesia: The National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) for 2014-2019 calls for 
comprehensive coverage of all citizens throughout the lifecycle, including special programs for 
poor people. Overall, social assistance funding has been relatively weak as part of Indonesian 
social protection policy, representing only 29.7% of the social protection budget in 2015. 
However, this is apparently starting to change, as the current president has placed social 
assistance at the center of Indonesia’s inclusive growth strategy. Social assistance is also an 
important component of the RPJMN (2014-2019), which focuses on reducing inequality between 
income groups. 
Relevant programs include the ‘Rice for the Poor: Rastra’ food subsidy program, which benefits 
about one-quarter of Indonesian households and provides 15kg of rice per household at 
$0.12/kg (rice represents 25% of poor households’ monthly expenditure); a cash transfer 
targeting schoolchildren and students aged 6-21, paid directly to eligible beneficiaries to support 
schooling expenses (e.g. supplies, fees, transport); a conditional cash transfer targeting poor 
families with lactating or pregnant mothers or with children who are still in primary or secondary 
education, or with adults aged 70 or over who do not receive any other social assistance 
transfers or who are severely disabled; and a grant program to incubate small businesses; etc. 
(OECD 2019). 
Of particular importance to the social protection structure in Indonesia, especially concerning 
targeting, is the development of and reliance on the Unified Database (UDB), which serves as 
the basis for social assistance programs and their eligibility and targeting. It contains details of 
the poorest 40% of the population, i.e. nearly 25 million households or almost 100 million 
individuals. 
 
Pakistan: In 2019, Pakistan launched a new social protection program named ‘Ehsaas’, 
meaning ‘empathy’. The new program is meant to turn Pakistan into a ‘welfare state’, including 
by ‘leveraging 21st century tools’ such as data and technology for precision targeting, access to 
digital services, etc. The program’s four pillars include: ‘addressing elite capture and making the 
government system work to create equality; safety nets for disadvantaged segments of the 
population; jobs and livelihoods; and human capital development’ (Government of Pakistan 
2019). The initiative has given rise to a total of 134 policies so far. The overarching goals of 
Ehsaas are to establish a safety net for at least 10 million families, livelihood opportunities for 3.8 
million individuals, financial access to healthcare for 10 million families, scholarships and 
education incentives for five million students (50% girls), financial and digital inclusion for seven 
million individuals (90% women), etc. Under this program, social protection spending in Pakistan 
will be increased from 0.7% of GDP to 1% of GDP by 2021. The program also plans to create 
livelihood opportunities in rural areas by developing the agricultural sector, which it identifies as 
the ‘backbone’ of Pakistan’s economy. It aims to do so, for example, by developing locally 
relevant value chains, and ultimately increasing the productivity and incomes of subsistence 
farmers. 
The ‘Kifalat’ component will bring reform to the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), the 
largest and most well-known social protection program in Pakistan, including by increasing the 
size of the cash transfer to bring it in line with inflation, and by increasing the options available to 
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graduate out of the program. BISP is an unconditional cash transfer program which started in 
2008, and which had reached 5.7 million of 7.7 eligible families as of 2016. Of the beneficiaries, 
48% were in the poorest quintile; this is slightly lower than the proportion of the poorest quintile 
in the Bolsa Familia (55%). The transfer, which in 2013 increased from 1,000 Rs. to 1,500 Rs., is 
paid monthly, exclusively to women aged 15 or older. Most beneficiaries (80%) are reported to 
have prioritized food expenditure from the transfer, and another study found a statistically 
significant increase in food expenditure as a result of the transfer. BISP was shown not to have a 
negative impact on labor force participation rates, which decreased across all quintiles between 
2005-06 and 2010-11. 
3.2 Individual and household factors 
Young peoples’ employment and life outcomes depend on whether they live in an enabling context: 
an area with high-performing schools, healthcare, safe neighborhoods, stable housing and adherence 
to social norms may prepare them well for work (Sumberg, Chamberlin et al. 2019). Most (72%) rural 
youth in developing countries live in places with low levels of agricultural value-added per worker 
(IFAD 2019), making it difficult for them to escape poverty through farming activities. They typically 
live as dependents in large families, which also shapes their opportunities (IFAD 2019).  
3.2.1 Education and skills 
Rural youth have significantly lower levels of education and skills than their urban counterparts; 19% 
of rural youth have never attended school, and 48% have only completed primary school (OECD 
2018). Only 10.5% and 10% of rural youth have completed vocational training or tertiary education, 
respectively. Meanwhile over 60% of their urban neighbors are likely to complete at least secondary 
school, and are also more likely to complete vocational training (11.5%) and tertiary education 
(18.1%) (OECD 2018). Rural youth in sub-Saharan Africa and in low-income countries are the least 
likely to go to or complete school: the more rural the area a young person lives in, the less likely they 
are to go to school (Sumberg, Chamberlin et al. 2019). 
 
Table 3 Primary school completion rates among population aged 3-5 years above graduation age 
(%)  
Countries  Total  Male  Female  Urban  Rural 
Bangladesh 72 66 79 75 72 
Ethiopia 43 43 43 76 33 
Indonesia 95 94 96 98 92 
Pakistan 61 63 59 76 54 
(Source: UNICEF 2018)
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Upper secondary school completion rates among population aged 3-5 years above 
graduation age (%)   
Countries  Total   Male   Female   Urban   Rural  
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Bangladesh  28   31   26   36   25  
Ethiopia  13   13   12   32   5  
Indonesia  50   52   48   65   33  
Pakistan  36   40   32   53   27  
(Source: UNICEF 2018) 
Rural youth lack the skills and qualifications to access better-paying wage work; private sector 
employers in rural areas struggle to find qualified candidates for job openings. Technical and 
Vocational Education Training (TVET) programs often either fail to teach subjects and skills that 
are relevant to the labor market, or do not reach out-of-school and low-educated youth. Only 
39.4% of rural youth have achieved the level of education required for their current job, 
compared to 46.9% in urban areas. As always, there is great variance between countries: 
under-qualification is most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (OECD 2018).  
3.2.2 Gender and social norms 
Rural young women face triple and overlapping discrimination on the basis of their gender, rural 
location and age. From a young age, social norms often mean girls are overlooked when it 
comes to parents’ investments in their children. Gender norms often dictate which jobs are seen 
as socially acceptable and/or ‘normal’ for rural young women, and these tend to be less 
productive jobs. In 104 countries there are laws that make it illegal for women to work in certain 
occupations (IFAD 2019; World Bank 2018a).  
 
Christian Meyer, Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College and the 
Department of Economics at the University of Oxford 
‘In Ethiopia women are strongly disadvantaged in the labor market in general and in 
rural labor markets in particular’. 
Gender inequalities are also perpetuated through agricultural work; men tend to be assigned to 
more productive and profitable plots of land than women. In non-farm rural employment, women 
tend to focus on lower-productivity work such as food preparation and delivery, while men work 
in higher-productivity jobs (IFAD 2019). Rural young women also tend to own fewer, lower-value 
and less productive assets, meaning they are less able to use them as collateral for financial 
services, to overcome shocks or to make productive use of them to earn higher incomes. Rural 
young women are 50% less likely than rural young men to have sole ownership of land (IFAD 
2019), and inheritance laws are often written and interpreted in ways that discriminate against 
women.  
3.2.3 Access to finance and land 
Access to finance is a barrier for rural youth employment on and off the farm. The profitability of 
farming depends on access to inputs, especially when producing for external markets, but these 
inputs may be unaffordable to rural youth without the use of credit. Self-employment in non-farm 
activities often requires initial investment, which again may be out of the reach of rural youth 
without credit (IFAD 2019).  
Rural youth are significantly less likely than their urban peers to have a formal bank account 
(Gasparri and Munoz 2019) and women are less likely to have a bank account than men, 
making rural young women especially unlikely to have an account with a formal banking 
institution. A lack of credit history and land/assets that could be used as collateral make it even 
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more difficult for rural youth, and particularly rural young women, to access formal financial 
services.  
Access to land has always been a challenge for rural youth, and this situation is worsening. 
Rural areas are now more densely populated than in the past, meaning available plots are 
smaller; increased longevity means youth inherit land later in life; and medium-scale commercial 
farms have been increasing in number, leading to increased competition over land (Bezu and 
Holden 2014).  
 
Samuel Keno, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency  
‘There are some opportunities and challenges to expand rural employment in rural areas. 
For example, in agricultural crop production, only 25% of the potential arable land is 
cultivated with the existing resources and technologies. So, there is a wide opportunity for 
employment to cultivate the uncultivated land by supporting people with technologies. The 
existing government policy encourages both rural youth employment creation and the 
development of uncultivated lands for agricultural production. But there are some 
challenges: almost all farm operations are carried out in the traditional way of farming and 
not supported by agricultural mechanization. The market linkage system is not in place. 
Most rural youth seems to have less interest in engaging in agricultural production and 
prefer to migrate to urban areas for daily labor work. Even those youth that remain in rural 
areas find that their family land gets divided into smaller and smaller parcels for each 
generation, or the land may be transferred to investors which discourages them from 
remaining in the sector’.    
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4 MEGATRENDS AND THE 
FUTURE OF WORK 
This section explores the four ‘megatrends’ that are expected to impact the future of work in 
LMICs, specifically in relation to rural areas of the four EYW countries. These are: demographic 
change, climate change, technological change and shifting power. 
4.1 Demographic change 
Two-thirds of the global population live in either a rural area or an urban settlement with fewer 
than 300,000 people (UNDESA 2019). The global urban population has grown 50% faster than 
the global population more generally (UNDESA 2019), but rural populations have doubled since 
1950 and have nearly quadrupled in least developed countries. Rural areas have also become 
more densely populated (IFAD 2019).  
 
Ruchika Bahl, ILO Country Office for Ethiopia and Somalia 
‘Ethiopia has a youth bulge and high levels of graduate unemployment. Many young 
people cannot access decent work and employment on completion of their full time 
education. There is no effective school-to-work transition model in the country and schools 
do not provide the life skills necessary to participate in the labor market’.    
Some 58% of the global urban population are concentrated in secondary cities and urban 
settlements with fewer than one million people, which are growing faster than primary capital 
cities and megacities. They are vital hubs and catalysts: unlocking the development potential of 
sub-regions by performing important governance, logistical and production functions (Roberts 
and Hohmann 2014: 3). Supporting secondary cities and rural towns can improve employment 
prospects for rural youth, especially by creating off-farm opportunities. But despite this growth 
and potential, secondary cities have difficulties attracting investment, creating and retaining 
jobs, lowering unemployment levels, and diversifying and revitalizing their economies. They are 
also more likely than primary cities and megacities to have inadequate essential urban services, 
housing and infrastructure.  
4.1.1 Urbanization in EYW countries  
All four EYW countries are among the 10 countries identified by the UN as being due to 
increase their urban populations by at least 50 million between 2018 and 2050 (UNDESA 2019). 
Together, these 10 countries are expected to contribute to 50% of global urbanization by 2050. 
All four EYW countries are also among the top eight countries with regards to rural population 
size (UNDESA 2019). Globally, the rural population is expected to decline slightly between 2018 
and 2050, from 3.4 billion to 3.1 billion. However, there is great disparity between rural trends in 
the four EYW countries, as shown in the table below. 
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Table 5 Changes in rural populations in EYW countries (Source: UNDESA 2019) 
Country Projected change 
in rural population 
between 2018 and 
2050 
Relative change in 
rural population 
Rank 
Two EYW countries with growing rural populations 
Ethiopia + 31,126,000  + 36.5% 1st greatest projected 
increase 
Pakistan + 19,529,000  + 15.4% 7th greatest projected 
increase 
Two EYW countries with decreasing rural populations 
Indonesia -31,746,000 -26.6% 3rd largest projected 
decrease 
Bangladesh -21,334,000 -20.2% 4th largest projected 
decrease 
4.1.2 Migration 
In developing economies as much as 10% of the population work overseas, and migrant worker 
remittances now exceed half a trillion dollars annually (World Bank 2019a). These incomes are 
a key source of foreign exchange earnings and a substantial economic contributor to millions of 
family incomes. The importance of this sector to the economy is reflected in the establishment in 
several countries of a ministry for overseas workers, that in some cases contract with other 
nations to provide millions of trained workers annually. Talent migration (‘brain drain’), family 
fracture and remittance dependency are major challenges facing developing economies 
worldwide, including in Haiti, Honduras, Nepal and Liberia (McCarthy 2018). Migrant workers 
often face precarity, discrimination and abuse due to unequal power relations along lines of 
gender, ethnicity and class (Lan 2006; Miles et al. 2019).  
 
Anis Zaman, Skills 21 Project of International Labour Organisation, Bangladesh 
‘The country is producing thousands of trained youth, but they are not getting jobs as per 
their expectation and in some cases. The job market is also not wider in Bangladesh in 
terms of its’ population. Therefore the country is exporting it’s skilled human resources for 
jobs that exist in the Middle East and elsewhere through ministry of expatriates’ welfare & 
overseas employment (MoEWFE). We have conducted research into how many jobs 
overseas will be required in each of our focal areas - electrical, construction, etc. We 
estimate 40% future growth of needs in these areas.    
People get overseas work through government programs or through private recruitment 
agencies. What we are trying to promote is skills certification for export labor. Govt and 
private. When they go private they are losing because they often sell land or take loans to 
pay $5,000 to get a job overseas. Then they come back with nothing, no land and debts.   
The government is targeting to export one million workers every year in order to increase 
remittance incomes. There is a dedicated Ministry of Expatriate Employment to support 
worker export and increase remittances. If our workers are not adequately trained and 
certificated they will not earn high incomes and will remit less. The system needs to 
respond to foreign market demand and supply certificated, trained labor with soft skills.  
We need to ensure decent jobs and increase remittance per capita. Many workers going 
overseas are not properly trained and certificated and therefore not earning enough money 
to remit.’ 
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4.2 Climate change  
Ruchika Bahl, ILO Country Office for Ethiopia and Somalia 
‘Climate change means shifts in agricultural outcomes. Lands are suffering from climate 
change and overuse. Young people are moving away from traditional subsistence 
agriculture.’  
Three elements determine an individual or group’s vulnerability to climate change: exposure, 
sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Füssel 2007; IPCC 2014). Rural youth are more likely to be 
worse off than the rest of the population with regards to all three, and are heavily concentrated 
in countries with a medium or high risk of increased heat stress due to climate change. Rural 
youth, and especially those in low-income countries and in sub-Saharan Africa, are severely 
exposed. They have limited options for work outside of the agricultural sector and lack social 
capital, skills and agency (IFAD 2019). This lack of access to resources and assets lowers their 
adaptive capacity.  
Agriculture will be negatively affected by climate change along with other sectors that largely 
depend on natural resources, such as forestry, fisheries and livestock – all of which are 
prevalent employment sectors in rural areas.  
 
EYW countries and climate change 
Indonesia is highly sensitive to climate change because of its many small islands. Many 
Indonesians in rural areas are reliant on climate-sensitive agriculture and fisheries (Wise et 
al. 2016). 
Ethiopia is overwhelmingly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and is hit by drought with 
increasing regularity (Mersha and Van Laerhoven 2016). Climate change is expected to 
severely impact farming and increase food insecurity (Weldegebriel and Prowse 2013).  
Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world, and is highly 
susceptible to agricultural damage. In coastal Bangladesh, 35 million people are vulnerable 
and exposed to multiple climate change hazards. Climate change is destroying 
biodiversity, leading to a loss of agricultural jobs, a reduction in agricultural production and 
mounting food insecurity (Huq et al. 2015). 
Pakistan is highly vulnerable to climate change, with changes in rainfall patterns, droughts 
and floods already evident. The economy of Pakistan is largely agrarian, employing 42.3% 
of the labor force and providing livelihood opportunities for around 62% of the rural 
population (Gadiwala and Burke 2019). Climate change threatens water, food and 
livelihood security, particularly in rural areas (Ali et al. 2017). 
 
Climate change is expected to further exacerbate land ownership issues for rural youth, as it 
might render much of today’s agriculturally productive land unproductive (De Schutter 2014). 
The productivity of major crops is expected to decrease, causing prices to increase (IFAD 
2019). Furthermore, climate change is expected to put additional strain on already relatively 
poor infrastructure, including roads and water systems, in rural areas – especially the least 
connected ones – making it even harder for rural youth to access markets in the future (IFAD 
2019). 
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Mahatmi Saraonto, Director for Manpower and Expansion of Employment 
Opportunities: National Development Planning Agency, Indonesia  
‘Climate change has an enormous impact on the life of people in rural Indonesia. It has 
changed the nature of agriculture, which affects the production process. Unpredictable 
weather and climate has made the farmers in rural areas fail to earn the same income as 
before, due to a decrease in production.’  
4.2.1. Mitigating the impacts of climate change  
The impacts of climate change will vary across countries, and strategies are needed to address 
the impact in specific rural areas within countries. A balance is needed between visible short-
term adaptation measures and long-term measures. One worrying trend is that low-income 
countries are more likely to have a higher proportion of rural youth in their population, and thus 
have a more urgent need to deal with climate change, while at the same time having the least 
capacity to invest in measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change related impacts (IFAD 
2019).  
4.3 Technological change  
Today’s rural youth are facing an unprecedented rate of technological change with the growth in 
digital technologies. Mobile phones and the internet can help rural youth farmers to link with 
markets and access accurate weather information. E-commerce can help farmers to find and be 
found by more customers. Apps, websites and online platforms can help farmers integrate into 
the value chains serving international markets. However, digital divides in access to and use of 
technologies mean that rural youth, and especially rural young women, are unlikely to be able to 
take advantage of these opportunities and risk being left behind (Hernandez and Roberts 2018).  
It is also pointless to introduce digital technologies into an agricultural context without first 
addressing farmers’ needs for resources such as seeds and agricultural equipment to improve 
their yields. The underlying logic of many mobile agriculture or ‘m-agriculture’ services is that 
farmers do not switch to more productive practices because they lack information on how to do 
so. However, research on m-agriculture services shows that farmers simply putting mobile 
agriculture advice into practice is unlikely. While farmers might act upon low-risk, no-expense 
advice delivered via mobile phone, they need additional advice and resources to implement 
more complex, high-risk practices (Barnett et al. 2019). Automation is also affecting agricultural 
work, with the potential for jobs to be lost to planting and harvesting machinery. 
 
Imtinan Ahmed, Skill Gains Limited, Pakistan 
‘New technologies are replacing people at work in agriculture; spraying seeds, pesticides 
and insecticides through drones and the use of tractors will replace farmers spraying them 
manually. Automated water sprinklers will replace gardeners.’  
Just as the Ethiopian government invests in the garment industry, attempting to get market 
share from Bangladesh, this industry is rapidly automating, with ‘sewbots’ (sewing robots) now 
able to slash the time taken by humans in manufacturing clothes and shoes (Nicolaou and 
Stacey 2017). It is also questionable whether jobs in these factories can be seen as ‘decent 
work’, as evidenced by recent research into jobs at Hawassa Industrial Park; the Ethiopian 
government set the lowest base wage in any garment-producing country to promote investment, 
but this leaves the predominantly female, rural labor force unable to afford housing, food and 
transport (Barrett and Baumann-Pauly 2019).  
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Christian Meyer, Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College and the 
Department of Economics at the University of Oxford. 
‘The Government of Ethiopia has pursued a strategy of labor-intensive industrialization 
through export-oriented light manufacturing. The strategy is predicated on the use of low-
cost and abundant labor as a source of competitive advantage within Global Value Chains, 
thereby addressing the twin challenges of job provision and industrial upgrading. For this 
purpose, the Government has encouraged foreign direct investment in the manufacturing 
sector, invested massively into enabling infrastructure, and set up a series of industrial 
parks spread across the country. Although it is too early to evaluate the effects of the 
overall development strategy, pieces of evidence so far point towards both successes and 
challenges’. 
Digital skills are vital even in jobs that existed before digital technology, or in roles that people 
would not necessarily immediately associate with digital technology (Hernandez and Roberts 
2018; S4YE 2018). S4YE (2018) has created a nuanced categorization of digital work: 
• ICT-intensive jobs, like mobile app development, are jobs that exist because of digital 
technology production or intensive use of digital technologies.  
• ICT-dependent jobs, such as online freelance work or customer services, are jobs that 
cannot be done without using digital technology as a tool.  
• ICT-enhanced jobs, like accounting and graphic design, are jobs that can be done more 
effectively or efficiently using digital technology but do not necessarily require its use. 
 
a2i-Innovate for all Bangladesh 
‘5.5 million people, which is 47% of the workforce of five sectors  will  lose  their  jobs  due  
to  automation  by  2041.  Breaking  down  this  number  across  the  industries show that 
2.7M (60%) will lose their jobs in Readymade Garments & Textile sector, 1.5M (60%) in 
Furniture sector,  600,000  (40%)  in  Agro-food  processing;  100,000  (35%)  in  Leather  
&  Footwear;  and  600,000 (20%) in Tourism and Hospitality sectors, respectively’. 
For more information, see a2i (2019) Future Skills: Finding Emerging Skills to Tackle the 
Challenges of Automation in Bangladesh 
https://a2i.gov.bd/publication/automation-in-bangladesh/  
4.3.1 Gender and access to technology 
Women face many barriers to accessing digital employment. These include: lower levels of 
digital device ownership and control; lower digital literacy and ICT skills and complementary 
non-ICT skills; low digital self-efficacy and self-confidence; biases against women pursuing an 
ICT-related education and career; and online safety concerns and threats of violence (S4YE 
2018). Social norms shape access to technology. In 2019, 48% of women globally were using 
the internet compared to 58% of men, with great levels of variation between and within 
countries. In the least developed countries, men are almost twice as likely as women (24.4% 
compared to 13.9%) to be online (ITU 2019). 
Girls are more likely than boys to have their access to digital technology mediated by a family 
member – usually a male – and only to have access by borrowing a device, which gives them 
less autonomy and privacy when they use digital technology (Girl Effect 2018). Often when a 
computer or mobile phone is bought, parents intend it to be used mostly by boys rather than 
girls (GSMA 2015; S4YE 2018). 
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Bayezid Khan, Assistant Professor of Development Studies, Khulna University, 
Bangladesh 
‘The government of Bangladesh has initiated many rural training programmes and set up 
more than 5,000 Union Digital Centres under the Digital Bangladesh project. There should 
be one female and one male entrepreneur running each Digital Centre. But in reality, all of 
the Centres are seen to be running by the male entrepreneurs where female entrepreneurs 
are absent.’ 
Girls in LMICs tend to be given access to digital technology at a later age than boys, and their 
parents are more likely to associate ICT-related jobs with boys than with girls (Girl Effect 2018; 
Livingstone et al. 2017). Girls are more likely than boys to think of the online space as unsafe, 
or their families are more likely to see it as unsafe for them to use (APC 2018). 
 
Table 6 Inequalities in mobile phone ownership in EYW countries (Source: Financial Inclusion 
Insights, 2017-2018) 
Country* Total Rural – Urban  Women – Men Poor – Non-
poor  
Bangladesh 
(2018) 
71% 68% - 78% 59% - 84% 68% - 80% 
Indonesia (2018) 70% 64% - 76% 66% - 75% 64% - 82% 
Pakistan (2017) 60% 55% - 70% 39% - 80% 52% - 69% 
* Figures were unavailable for Ethiopia 
4.3.2 Working online 
Online work can provide flexibility which can help women combine paid employment with unpaid 
care work, and often pays at a similar level to or more than the work available in the local 
market (S4YE 2018). However, it does not help women overcome the problems of mobility and 
expectations that mean they have less agency than men.  
Fardous Mohammad Safiul Azam, YPARD (Young Professionals for Agricultural 
Development) Bangladesh  
‘Rural communities are disadvantaged in the North and South-east where several ethnic 
groups also live. Political parties and therefore government have an urban focus in earlier 
decades in Bangladesh. Rural areas do not get the best connectivity. Also gendered social 
norms in Bangladesh require women to spend more time in the home. Online freelancing 
may allow rural, ethnic women to find work that fits around their domestic work and enable 
them to generate independent income from home’.     
Online work also brings new challenges. Online workers are typically considered to be self-
employed, and thus have less job security, do not receive benefits such as paid holiday and sick 
pay that formally employed workers may receive, and work in more precarious conditions. They 
often remain invisible to governments, making it difficult for governments to put in place labor 
regulation to tax the digital economy, and also to offer adequate social protection for online 
workers.  
The internet has changed the way people find out about and apply for job openings, as well as 
how employers advertise jobs and scan potential employees. Some job-matching apps, like 
‘MatchMe’ in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, allow potential applicants to be contacted via 
instant messaging services such as Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and SMS. Others, like 
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Babajob in India and Duma Works in Kenya, use SMS and automated voice calls. Digital 
technology can help workers in the informal economy to deal with uncertainty. For example, 
Lynk is a Kenyan online matching platform that helps workers in the informal economy (e.g. 
hairdressers, self-employed artisans, chefs and carpenters) to connect with customers, and 
provides them with additional services like onboarding and training (S4YE 2018). 
Several developing countries have managed to hold a significant portion of the market share in 
online freelance work, with India being home to 25% of all online work. Two EYW countries 
have also managed to access significant amounts of online work: Bangladesh and Pakistan are 
the second and fourth largest suppliers of online labor, with 13% and 10% of the market in 
2017, respectively (Ojanpera 2019).  
4.3.3. Outsourcing, microtasking and freelancing 
Business are increasingly outsourcing their business processes – including customer service, 
accounting, finance and human resources – to smaller firms in developing countries, where 
wages are lower. In some places where the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector has 
taken off, women make up a larger percentage of the workforce than they do in the rest of the 
economy. However, because they are dominated by companies from Anglophone countries 
(including the US, the UK and Australia), the majority of jobs in the BPO industry require a high 
level of English – which rural youth are less likely to have, especially in countries where English 
is not widely spoken.  
Unsurprisingly, countries with large numbers of people who are fluent in English, such as India 
and the Philippines, attract the most investment in BPO services. Although there are many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the language skills exist to provide BPO services in 
English and French, inadequate ICT and power infrastructure and a lack of IT specialists have 
been shown to be a barrier in all except South Africa and Mauritius (S4YE 2018). ‘Impact 
outsourcing’ builds BPO businesses that target historically disadvantaged communities, but is 
out of the reach of most marginalized youth, especially in rural settings where school 
attendance and attainment lags in comparison to urban areas (Rockefeller Foundation and 
Dalberg 2013: 4).  
 
Bayezid Khan, Assistant Professor of Development Studies, Khulna University, 
Bangladesh  
‘A good number of youth are doing good in online freelance work and the number is rising. 
However, they are also experiencing insecurity in securing contracts and in receiving 
payments. If these problems can be solved, there will be an expansion in this work. Even 
people without formal education are getting benefitted. However, their family mindset 
always regards being in front of a computer at home as wasting time – even if they are 
earning more money than a government job. Families want their children to have a proper 
government job’.   
‘Again, families want their children to have proper government jobs in an office. They don’t 
understand online freelancing. They want to see their children in formal jobs’.   
Self-employed individuals can offer services requiring technical and professional expertise (e.g. 
web design, market research, app development) online through ‘virtual freelancing’. Virtual 
freelance platforms such as Fiverr, Freelance, Guru and PeoplePerHour have emerged, where 
employers and freelancers can find each other. Freelancers tend to be paid relatively well, with 
the average freelance salary being $19 per hour globally, and workers typically earning wages 
comparable to or higher than those of people working in their local markets (Pofeldt 2017; S4YE 
2018: 4; World Bank 2015).  
 
 22 
 
Fardous Mohammad Safiul Azam, YPARD (Young Professionals for Agricultural 
Development) Bangladesh  
‘Through the Digital Bangladesh initiative the Government has been promoting outsourcing 
for nearly a decade. It is carried out mostly young people who can earn more online. 
Already in Bangladesh connectivity coverage in rural areas is already quite good and 
improving day by day. However, in government offices in rural areas and TVET centers the 
facilities there are need to be modernized with adequate ICT facilities. For most people 
there is good coverage – mostly 3G - but it is still expensive. If we want rural youth to be 
connected improvement needs to be made’.    
Digital technologies also make ‘microtasking’ possible as a form of employment, where 
employees are paid for individual tasks or pieces of work – typically small clerical tasks that can 
be completed quickly using a computer or smartphone. Some of the tasks done by 
microworkers include responding to surveys, proofreading, taking part in experiments, image 
identification, image tagging, audio and video transcription, translation, data verification, data 
collection and processing, and content moderation (ILO 2018: xv).  
Despite microwork in theory being available to anyone, in reality some countries have a much 
bigger share of the market than others; for example, 85% of microwork on ODesk – a popular 
microtask platform – is done by workers from just seven countries: India, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, the US, Russia and Ukraine (Graham 2014). Moreover, microtasking 
seems to be out of the reach of many rural youth. People employed in microtasks tend to be 
well educated, male, older and urban. Less than 18% of microworkers were found to have 
qualifications lower than a high-school degree (ILO 2018). Similarly, over 90% of microworkers 
on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform in India have at least a Bachelor’s degree, 
and 69% of them are men (Berg 2016). Globally, only one-third of microworkers are women. 
The gender gap is even more acute in developing countries, where women make up just one-
fifth of microworkers (ILO 2018).  
Microworkers typically earn a few cents or dollars per task that they complete; this varies 
enormously in terms of actual earnings and how these compare with the average wage. In 
India, for example, microworkers can earn up to 14 times the average national salary, while 
microworkers in other countries like the US can earn below the minimum wage (De Groen and 
Maselli 2016). On average, workers on these platforms earn $4.70 an hour in North America 
and only $1.33 and $2.22 an hour in Africa and Asia, respectively. Microtasking does not tend to 
be sufficient on its own, but is mainly used as a complementary source of income (S4YE 2018). 
Almost 60% of people working in microtasks feel there is an insufficient number of tasks 
available (ILO 2018). Microwork is also dependent on the quality of the supporting 
infrastructure, such as sufficiently fast internet connectivity. 
 
Christian Meyer, Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College and the 
Department of Economics at the University of Oxford. 
‘I do not believe that online microwork platforms or online labor markets can create 
significant employment in Ethiopia’s rural areas. Significant challenges relate to lack of 
telecommunication infrastructure and electricity shortages, as well as skill gaps’.  
4.3.4. Gig work 
Gig-work platforms include ‘ride-hailing’ apps (e.g. Uber), food delivery, courier and package 
transport, running errands, repairs, home cleaning, etc. While ride-hailing services are 
increasingly popular they require digital skills, access to a vehicle, access to a continuously 
connected digital device, and a driving license (S4YE 2018). On-demand services that women 
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are traditionally heavily involved in, such as domestic work, are also gaining traction. This is 
providing increased mobility for domestic workers and potentially reduces previous reliance on 
social capital and connections to gain such employment. (Hunt and Machingura 2016; S4YE 
2018).  
 
Mahatmi Saraonto, Director for Manpower and Expansion of Employment 
Opportunities: National Development Planning Agency, Indonesia  
‘With the rise of application-based start-up companies in Indonesia, there has been an 
increase in job opportunities. Gojek has successfully employed more than a million driver 
partners all over Indonesia, with a significant number of youth partners engaged in this 
work. Youth in rural areas are now getting more options of work. They may utilize the 
internet to sell their own product through mobile apps like Bukalapak, Tokopedia, etc. They 
may also apply to be a partner of Gojek and other start-up companies. However, this 
privilege only works for the rural areas which are located relatively near the city, with a 
decent internet infrastructure. Some of the remote areas are not able to access the internet 
because the communications infrastructure is still lacking.’  
Rural youth, especially those living in remote areas, are more likely to be structurally excluded 
from working on ride-hailing apps. Gojek in Indonesia requires at least a lower-secondary 
education, and 83% of drivers surveyed by S4YE (2018) had completed upper-secondary 
education. In Pakistan, on-demand gig-economy start-ups contribute to producing new jobs that 
draw young people away from rural areas. 
 
Muhammad Nasiruddin, The Hunar Foundation, Pakistan  
‘Mobile apps such as Uber, Careem and Foodpanda have played a great role in urban 
areas, providing new avenues of work. Those migrating from rural areas are observed to 
benefit from these apps and earn decent livelihoods. There are few efforts to tap into rural 
markets. This in turn increases the marginalization of rural youth.’  
4.3.5 Digital skills and inequalities 
Digital skills are increasingly a necessity for anyone seeking formal employment (Hernandez 
and Roberts 2018; S4YE 2018). Many services, tools and products used by self-employed 
people and people working in the informal sector are also increasingly being delivered digitally. 
Climate change might also increase the value of digital and cognitive skills for rural youth 
working in agriculture. In order to develop adaptation strategies they will need to be able to 
rapidly process increasingly complex information (IFAD 2019: 195). 
 
Anis Zaman, Skills 21, Bangladesh 
‘The government is keen to introduce new technologies. Yet TVET institutions don’t have 
good internet connections and they are not well equipped. We need good-quality, reliable 
internet. We can’t download attachments easily. When 100 people apply to study on digital 
courses, we have to turn 80 away.’  
Digital skills are amplified by and in turn amplify offline skills (UNESCO et al. 2018). Cognitive 
as well as ‘soft’ socio-emotional and behavioral skills – known as non-cognitive skills – have 
been identified as particularly important for the future of work because they complement digital 
 24 
 
skills (World Bank 2016b), although it should be noted that training in these skills does not 
necessarily lead to better outcomes Kluve et al. 2017).  
Our interviewees highlighted how work opportunities that are enabled by digital platforms can 
actually exacerbate inequalities, reinforce gender norms and stereotypes through the type of 
work on offer, and discriminate against disabled people.  
 
Mahatmi Saraonto, Director for Manpower and Expansion of Employment 
Opportunities: National Development Planning Agency, Indonesia  
‘In Indonesia, Gojek now employs more women, not only as drivers but also as workers for 
Go-clean (the cleaning service) and Go-glam (make-up and beauty salon service), go 
massage (home-massage service), etc. People with disabilities face more challenges in 
upgrading their skills to be able to cope with the changing nature of work in the future. 
Despite having a regulation to employ people with disabilities in a workplace, the 
compliance rate for this policy remains low. For this group, the challenge is very complex, 
since public infrastructure in Indonesia is not disability-friendly yet. And few ethnic 
minorities in rural Indonesia could benefit from the development of the new technology due 
to language, infrastructure and cultural barriers.’ 
Interviewees also emphasized how these platforms will not benefit those without good English 
skills.  
 
Bayezid Khan, Assistant Professor of Development Studies, Khulna University, 
Bangladesh 
‘In rural areas, low fluency in the English language is a barrier. The availability of the 
internet is not so good – so the advantage goes to urban educated, middle-class youth 
with good internet and English fluency.  They are also facing some challenges here. They 
experience difficulties in currency charges and fees and hidden charges. These challenges 
can be addressed with a proper concentration on the benefit of the youth group of 
Bangladesh.’    
4.4. Shifting power 
Recent years have seen a shift of power away from civil society towards authoritarian 
government, while many countries have experienced a closing of the civic spaces in which 
citizens can safely exercise their democratic rights to freedom of association and freedom of 
expression (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash 2016). Only 3% of the world’s population lives in 
countries with open civic space (CIVICUS 2020). The closing of civic space contributes to 
inequality by reducing the space in which civil society organizations can voice the concerns and 
priorities and defend the interests of marginalized and deprived groups, including rural youth 
and women.  
According to the most recent ratings, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Bangladesh are classified as 
having ‘repressed civic space’ and Indonesia is classified as having ‘obstructed civic space’. In 
countries classified as having repressed civic space, civil society members who criticize power 
holders risk surveillance, harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, injury and death. Obstructed 
civic space is defined as civic space that is heavily contested by power holders who impose a 
combination of legal and practical constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights 
(CIVICUS 2020). For example, youth organizations in Ethiopia that opposed the authoritarian 
government had to organize underground, in exile and online (Roberts 2019), while women 
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journalists in Pakistan experience online harassment and digital disinformation campaigns 
(Digital Rights Foundation 2020).  
 
These shifts in power do not affect all civil society groups in the same way: civic space has 
closed for democratic and human rights groups and for those confronting corruption and 
unaccountable governance. However, the civic space for some ‘nativist’, ultra-conservative and 
‘alt-right’ groups has widened (Hossain et al. 2019). Nor is the shift in power linear or 
uncontested, with openings and closings happening both offline and online. 
 
The closing of civic space directly threatens achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 
16.7, which is ‘inclusive, participatory, representative decision-making at every level’. The 
groups most at risk of being excluded from participation by closing civic space include rural 
youth, women and labor rights organizations. This power shift is also being played out in online 
spaces. In response to a closing of civic space offline, young people have made creative use of 
mobile tools to create new openings for civic space online, in which they exercise freedom of 
expression and association. For example, youth movements and smallholders in Ethiopia 
organized online to contest government land grabs for industrial agriculture, using mobile 
phones and social media (Roberts 2019). Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp are used to 
constitute new digital public spheres that young people use to voice their opinions, priorities and 
policy alternatives. However, availability, affordability, awareness, accessibility and agency limit 
the reach of digital civic space in many rural areas (Roberts and Hernandez 2019). 
 
Online civic space is also limited by internet shutdowns, digital surveillance and coordinated 
disinformation campaigns in a process that some analysts have referred to as a descent into 
‘digital authoritarianism’. Authoritarian governments, military units, criminal and terrorist groups 
and the alt-right now spend millions of dollars annually on disinformation to shape discourse, 
manufacture opinion and radicalize youth. They achieve this in part by employing small armies 
of human operatives and computerized ‘bots’ to influence opinion on social media and across 
this new digital public sphere (Woolley and Howard 2017). The shifts in power associated with 
closing civic space and towards online contestation and influencing are critical determinants of 
which voices will be heard in the shaping of future work. Young people have used digital spaces 
creatively and politically, and the gig and online freelance economies have provided new youth 
employment opportunities. However, rural youth have limited access and connectivity, and 
online gender-based violence is being used to close civic space for women. Enabling rural 
youth to take an active part in debates shaping the future of work, and extending the potential 
benefits of online freelance work and the gig economy to rural areas, will require interventions 
that specifically design for equity from the outset. 
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5 POLICIES FOR YOUTH 
EMPLOYMENT 
As we saw in section 3, ‘The Challenge of Rural Youth Employment’, employment opportunities 
for rural youth are impacted by factors at national, community, individual and household levels 
as well as by the global megatrends explored above. Each factor and trend impacts across all 
levels and is linked: policies addressing rural youth employment therefore need holistic 
approaches and integration between policy levels. 
 
Imtinan Ahmed Pakistan, Skill Gains Limited, Pakistan 
‘Implementing urban models in rural settings has never worked, as the problems faced by 
metropoles and small rural areas are different; therefore, they require different and 
specialized solutions.’  
At the end of this section we look at how the EYW countries are prepared for these trends and 
what civil society can do to influence policy in each country. Firstly, we look at the evidence for 
the policies on youth employment; we then explore the most effective way to analyze policies. 
Finally, we assess key youth employment policies in the EYW countries.  
It is clear that ‘one size fits all’ solutions don’t work; for example, in Indonesia the realities for 
youth in a rural area living close to a major city will differ substantially from those facing youth in 
a very remote area. Poorly educated young people, women and migrants living in rural areas 
will have very different experiences from well-educated, male, non-migrant youth.  
5.1. Tackling youth employment: policies versus 
structural transformation  
Addressing inequalities needs to be at the heart of policy making; there are limits to what can be 
achieved by focusing on education and employment without addressing the underlying causes 
of young people’s unequal position in society (Glassco and Holguin 2016). Given these 
constraints, it is unsurprising that there is a lack of evidence as to whether interventions to 
improve rural youth employment outcomes actually work (Hatayama 2018): almost two out of 
every three youth employment interventions fail to show any impact (S4YE 2018).  
The inclusion of rural youth in policy-making processes can help create policies that are better 
informed by the lived experiences of rural youth, and better able to tackle the problems they 
face (IFAD 2019). There are different levels of youth engagement in decision making: these 
range from simply receiving information, being consulted by decision makers, through to co-
decision making and youth making autonomous decisions. The higher levels of youth 
engagement require youth to have higher levels of communication and leadership skills in order 
to engage effectively (OECD 2018). It is also vital to recognize the heterogeneity of experience 
among rural youth, both within and between different rural communities.  
The sections below look at a range of policies aimed at tackling youth employment.  
5.1.1. Supply- and demand-side interventions  
Policies to tackle youth employment are typically categorized into demand- and supply-side 
interventions. They are based on different assumptions; either a demand created by a good 
business climate and availability of jobs, or a supply of youth with the right skills and potential. 
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However, these assumptions rarely hold true in developing countries, especially in rural areas 
where both the business climate and youth employability are likely to be inadequate. Rural 
youth employment issues are likely to be best addressed by several interventions implemented 
in tandem (Fox and Kaul 2018). For example, skills training interventions have limited outcomes 
on their own, but have more impact when combined with other interventions (Hatayama 2018).  
 
Dr Shahid Qureshi, Associate Professor and Program Director, AMAN Center for 
Entrepreneurial Development, Pakistan 
‘The existing school systems lacks the entrepreneurial mindset, innovation and creativity to 
prepare the leaders of tomorrow. This needs to be inculcated.  The stakeholders should 
promote the entrepreneurial mindset through advocacy revolving around local problems 
and opportunities.  Resources need to be given to developing an entrepreneurial mindset 
to create opportunities and solve local problems which are environmentally, socially and 
ethically sensitive’.    
The OECD (2018) recommends that improving the access of rural youth to jobs in the 
agricultural value chain requires work at three levels: macro (regulatory frameworks, national 
development strategies and trade policies), meso (e.g. industry standards) and micro (capacity 
building, equipment upgrades and access to capital for youth and small-scale farmers).  
 
Assumptions underpinning interventions 
Supply-side interventions assume that there is an adequate business climate and that an 
adequate number of jobs are available, but that youth are currently not sufficiently qualified 
to fill them. Supply-side interventions include skills training (e.g. vocational, technical, 
business, life skills, employability), counselling and mentoring services for self-employment 
and wage employment, transportation subsidies to make it easier for youth to search for 
jobs, and matching services that link youth with job vacancies. 
Demand-side interventions – also known as ‘business climate interventions’ – assume an 
adequate supply of youth with the characteristics needed to be successful in the labor 
market, that could be brought into work or benefit from better wages if the business climate 
improves. Common demand-side interventions include improving access to finance and 
microfinance, reducing firm taxation, seeking to improve the profitability of firms (e.g. 
through management training and mentoring) and providing firms with employment 
subsidies to encourage hiring of youth (Fox and Kaul 2018). 
S4YE (2018) found that supply-side programs targeting women tended to face challenges in 
recruiting women due to time constraints resulting from household responsibilities, safety 
concerns that hinder women’s mobility, and affordability concerns regarding travel and meals.  
 
Anis Zaman, Skills 21, Bangladesh 
‘We are trying to ensure the same treatment for all. We have targets to increase inclusion. 
We are making “reasonable adjustments” to include people with disabilities in training. 
There are targets to increase the number of people with disabilities. However, the truth is 
that if men and women have exactly the same qualifications it is still men that get more 
benefit. Most employers prefer to employ men. We are trying to change their mindset to 
balance gender equality. Having industry-institution panels is one way to have these 
conversations.’  
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Skills training programs aim to enhance the human capital of youth to achieve long-term 
improvements in employment, earnings and business performance. Skills training and 
entrepreneurship promotion interventions appear to yield positive results, but training programs 
implemented in multiple settings (e.g. classroom and on the job) are more effective than those 
that take place in only one setting (Kluve et al. 2017).  
 
Mahatmi Saraonto, Director for Manpower and Expansion of Employment 
Opportunities: National Development Planning Agency, Indonesia  
‘Targeting is the key to reduce the inequality in skills in different groups. For instance, in 
entrepreneurship opportunities there are some programs specifically targeting women in 
rural areas as their beneficiaries, in order to improve gender equality. In addition, 
affirmative policies are also able to overcome this inequality issue. Specific policies or 
programs targeting people with disability with work opportunities may improve their 
involvement in the labor market and [enable them to] be productive. We believe that an 
effective targeting approach is the key to deal with rising inequality.’   
In many places it is seen as inappropriate for rural young women to travel outside the home 
without the presence of a male guardian. They therefore find it more difficult to access training, 
apprenticeships and internships, since these tend to require travel and their mobility is likely to 
be constrained by social norms (OECD 2018). For this reason, trainings that take place closer 
to where rural young people live – rather than trainings in urban areas, that require them to 
travel – are more likely to be inclusive of rural young women. A lack of mobility limits the 
networks that rural young women can access, and thus restricts their social, economic and 
political participation (IFAD 2019). 
Despite the increasing awareness and popularity of soft skills such as self-management, 
teamwork and communication, trainings in these skills have not been shown to systematically 
lead to better employment outcomes (Kluve et al. 2017). 
 
Muhammad Nasiruddin, The Hunar Foundation, Pakistan 
‘Most of the training opportunities are available in big cities. It is costly for rural youth to 
relocate and learn skills. We at Hunar Foundation established training institutes in smaller 
towns so that rural and semi-urban youth can benefit. Other private sector organizations 
and government institutes need to be placed in locations which ensure access for rural 
youth.  
We are working on increasing awareness among youth. We have strategically located our 
seven campuses, which equally helps rural youth and urban/semi-urban youth. To 
increase interest in vocational trainings, we have signed MOUs with local employers for 
internships/apprenticeships.  
In Pakistan, in government institutes, review of the curriculum is not existent. Courses are 
run for years without realizing that these courses are outdated. Few private sector 
institutions introduce new courses such as Facebook marketing, 3D systems, website 
development, freelancing, etc. There is lack of new technology and content as well. It is 
important to upgrade the institutes as per current technology, so that skills of the workforce 
keep up with technology.’ 
Employment services match jobseekers with vacancies through placements, mentoring and 
financial support for job seeking, such as covering transport and childcare costs. However, 
there is not a strong evidence base for these interventions in LMICs, especially in rural areas. 
The impacts of employment-matching services have been found to be largely transitory, rather 
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than providing youth with a stepping stone to sustained employment or better wages (Franklin 
2014; Kluve et al. 2017). 
 
Promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment 
Interventions to promote entrepreneurship and self-employment seek to reduce the 
external constraints that youth experience when starting or growing a business, through 
improving entrepreneurial skills and access to credit. They include business and 
management training, business advisory services, improved access to markets and value 
chains, and improved access to credit, grants and micro franchising. They need national 
policy intervention through reform and more consistent enforcement of business regulation, 
in order to reduce red tape and increase transparency (Kilimani 2017). (Kluve et al. 2017). 
In many contexts, self-employment can be seen as the only feasible way for young people 
to generate an income in low-employment or economically depressed areas where no 
formal opportunities exist, given the already overloaded public sectors of many LMICs. 
Improving macro conditions and economic growth appears to reduce levels of self-
employment and the need to enter informal labor markets. The ILO reflects that 
‘encouraging self-employment is not a particularly effective policy mechanism by which to 
promote upward social mobility or reduce poverty’ (Burchell, Coutts, Hall and Pye 2015).  
Wage subsidy programs  
These seek to incentivize the hiring of youth who may have lower levels of productivity. 
Wage subsidies work better in middle-income countries than in high-income countries, 
though there is a lack of evidence on wage subsidy programs in rural areas in low-income 
countries (Kluve et al. 2017). 
5.2. What are EYW countries doing? 
Rural youth employment is shaped by and shapes many other factors and issues, making it 
hard for different actors to know how to intervene. However, an analysis of the existing policies 
can provide some directions for actors, as described in the policy-making framework set out by 
Sumner et al. (2011), which is outlined below. 
Evidence can help shape policy making in three ways:  
• Agenda setting: using evidence to change priorities or to prioritize something that was 
previously under-emphasized. 
• Changes in policy content: changes to the way a specific problem is approached or how 
the resources are allocated to specific interventions. 
• Changes in the policy delivery approach: substantive change in the way policy is 
implemented and/or the way policy is delivered to intended recipients.  
The framework breaks this down further into seven actions for civil society. 
1. Agenda setting: 
• Applaud policy maker for including the issue on the agenda and seek to check whether 
it is being implemented as per the policy.  
• Put something on the agenda that is not currently being tackled.  
 
2. Changes in policy content: 
• Where the issue is mentioned but nothing is being done, advocate for something to be 
done or for linkages to be made with actors that can do something about it. 
 30 
 
• Where an issue is acknowledged but is being tackled in the wrong way, advocate for 
different approaches. 
 
3. Changes in the policy delivery approach: 
• Applaud policy makers for taking ‘evidence-informed’ approaches to the policy in 
general (e.g. coordinating between ministries, taking extra steps to ensure the 
inclusion of vulnerable youth, etc.) and check whether it is being implemented.  
• Advocate to put the evidence-informed approach on the agenda, if the policy shows no 
signs of it.  
• Advocate for something to change or something new to be done when there are signs 
that the policy approach is going in the wrong direction.  
We selected policies to analyze, with priority given to:  
1. The country’s rural youth employment policy, a youth employment policy that touches on 
rural youth, or an employment policy that touches on both. 
2. The most recent and important of these policies, since this will show the government’s 
latest thinking on the matter.  
3. The policy is holistic and complexity aware. 
 
On this basis, the following policies were selected for analysis: 
• Bangladesh: the National Youth Policy 2017 and the National Skills Development Policy 
2011.  
• Indonesia: The National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN); RPJMN 2020-2024 is 
the fourth phase of implementation of the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN 
2005-2025). We also analyzed the Presidential Regulation No. 66/2017 on Cross-Sectoral 
Strategic Coordination and Implementation of Youth Service. 
• Ethiopia: the national Plan of Action for Job Creation 2020-2025 Briefing Document. 
• Pakistan: the Sindh Youth Policy 2018.  
Using our conceptual framework, we ‘tested’ each of the selected policies against the 
megatrends and drivers of inequality which are impacting on the future of work for rural youth. 
Table 7 below shows our analysis, including our findings on whether the approach taken to 
youth policy is appropriate. Full details of our analysis are available in Annex 1 (available upon 
request). 
We looked at whether an issue was mentioned in youth policy, and (where it was mentioned) 
whether something was being done about it. In some cases, we have included 
recommendations for civil society based on the evidence-based policy-making framework 
outlined above.  
We also analyzed the enabling environment to help understand how policies are approached, 
using the following criteria:  
• Is there a dedicated youth employment ministry or department in the country?  
• Is there effective coordination between ministries?  
• Are both demand- and supply-side rural youth employment barriers addressed in the 
policy?  
• Are rural youth involved in policy making on rural youth employment?  
• Are rural youth involved in policy making more generally?  
• Are additional efforts being made to reach especially marginalized groups in rural areas? 
• Is there an emphasis on reaching youth in the policy?  
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• Is there an emphasis on reaching rural people in the policy?  
• Is there an emphasis on reaching rural youth in the policy?  
• Is there an emphasis on reaching women in the policy?  
• Is there an emphasis on reaching rural women in the policy?  
• Does the policy mention urban/rural divides? 
• Is there consciousness of heterogeneity between and within rural areas?  
• Is funding available/committed?  
• Is there monitoring and evaluation of the policy?  
• Are policies being adapted based on evidence?  
The color-coding indicates whether an issue is recognized and whether it is being addressed in 
the correct way.  
 
 
Applaud and check implementation 
 
Put on the agenda 
 
Ask the government to do something different to what it is currently doing 
 
Applaud the government for recognizing the problem but ask them to do some-
thing about it (in instances where they mention an issue but aren’t tackling it)  
 
Table 7 Assessment of youth employment policies in EYW countries 
Factor Bangladesh Ethiopia Pakistan Indonesia 
Megatrends 
Demographic change 
    
Population growth         
Youth bulge         
Urbanization         
Environmental pressures 
    
Climate change         
Green + new economy         
Technological change 
    
Automation + digitization         
Frontier tech         
Growth of online outsourcing         
Gig economy         
Shifting power 
    
Backlash against women’s rights         
Growing global feminist movement         
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Economic changes 
    
Economic globalization and neoliberalism         
Drivers of inequality 
Access to assets 
    
Land         
Finance         
Farming technology         
Enabling environment 
    
Infrastructure 
    
Roads         
Water supply         
Electricity/energy         
Fibre optic cables         
Telecommunications         
Education 
    
Basic education         
Digital skills being taught         
Economic 
    
Private investment         
Availability of formal work         
Availability of skilled work         
Overall economic opportunities         
Opportunities in rural areas         
Approach 
Youth-dedicated ministry         
Coordination         
Efforts to reach marginalized youth         
Emphasis on rural youth         
Emphasis on women         
Funding commitments         
Monitoring and evaluation         
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6 CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Tackling inequalities should be at the heart of youth policies, since opportunities will improve 
only as economies transform. This needs to be the focus for low- and middle-income countries. 
The agenda includes transformation of the rural economic space, increased connectivity 
between rural and urban areas, and measures to increase private investment in rural areas in 
labor-intensive production of goods and services so that more wage labor will be on offer (Fox 
and Kaul 2018: 35). This section looks at policies that might reduce the risk of the megatrends 
increasing inequalities for rural youth. 
 
1. What are the expected changes in work and income-generating activities for young 
people in rural areas? 
It is clear that climate change will have a significant impact on young people’s livelihoods. In 
terms of digitization, there is a significant growth in work enabled by digital tools, including 
online freelancing and gig work, but there is also a danger of a race to the bottom (driving down 
pay and conditions). At the same time, automation is closing down traditional paths to rural 
development and reducing the number of jobs in some sectors. 
 
2. Do existing policies anticipate the future of work? 
Our analysis in the previous section shows that policies in the EYW countries anticipate the 
future of work in a limited way, with worrying little attention to technological and environmental 
change. In terms of the overall approach and enabling environment, the picture is a little 
brighter. Our research shows the reality of life for rural young people. The majority rely on 
smallholding subsistence agriculture which is precarious, seasonal, unpredictable, low-income 
and low status. The unpredictability of globalized markets for farm produce and the impacts of 
climate change and industrial farming is making smallholder farming less attractive over time, 
and even young people with land are increasingly disinclined to take up farming. However, 
because few other employment opportunities exist in rural areas, migration to urban areas and 
foreign countries is seen as a more attractive option. NGOs and governments will need to 
advocate for investment in rural locations and for other affirmative actions that benefit those 
most likely to be left behind.  
 
Samuel Keno, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency  
‘Mandated government bodies, policy makers and donors need to focus on rural youth to 
attain national targets of agricultural production and food security. The rural youth need to 
be supported in getting access to agricultural mechanization services provision, access to 
rural finances, digitalization of market linkages, market information, training for business 
management and new technologies’.      
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6.1.1. Social protection and universal basic income 
Social assistance programs are more likely to benefit young people, directly or indirectly, than 
social insurance programs. This partly stems from the fact that young people can actually 
benefit directly from social assistance programs, such as public works programs, or cash 
transfers such as the BISP in Pakistan, which directly targets all poor women aged 15 and 
above. Social insurance programs are less likely to benefit young people, particularly those in 
rural areas, because they are unlikely to be members of a household involved in formal 
employment, which is typically a requirement of such programs. Therefore, social assistance 
programs, which also often include rural people (or specifically target them, as in the case of 
some public works programs), are more relevant to rural young people and should therefore be 
prioritized. Social protection should be extended further, both in quality and quantity, but not at 
the expense of the poorest and most vulnerable people, i.e. household and/or informal workers 
(Meagher 2020). This could also include the provision of universal basic income (UBI) or 
universal basic services (UBS).  
6.1.2. Climate change 
‘Greening’ local rural economies through more sustainable agricultural, forestry, fishery, mining 
and tourism practices can help to ensure that rural youth will be able to continue to depend on 
the environment and natural resources in the future. The International Labour Organization’s 
World Employment Social Outlook for 2018 suggested that ‘The adoption of more sustainable 
agricultural policies can create wage employment in medium and large organic farms, and allow 
smallholders to diversify their sources of income through a transition to conservation agriculture’ 
(International Labour Office 2018).  
 
Climate change adaptation strategies for agriculture include: 
• Micro-level options, such as crop diversification and altering the timing of operations.  
• Market responses, such as income diversification and credit schemes.  
• Institutional changes – mainly government responses – such as subsidies/taxes and 
improvement in agricultural markets.  
• Technological developments, such as the development and promotion of new crop 
varieties and advances in water management techniques (Ali and Erenstein 2017). 
New agricultural practices such as precision agriculture, agroecology, the use of ICTs (e.g. 
mAgriculture apps) and the use of renewable energy may create employment opportunities for 
rural youth. The majority of the 1.5 billion people without access to electricity live in rural areas, 
so the production and supply of renewable electricity may be a large untapped market capable 
of employing many rural youth. Eco-tourism provides another off-farm opportunity to boost rural 
economies and rural youth employment (OECD 2018). Moreover, multinational agri-food 
companies are largely responsible for deforestation and destruction of biodiversity and the 
environment through the use of chemicals to increase productivity. They could play an important 
role in both helping to tackle rural youth unemployment through making their value chains more 
inclusive, and helping to create green jobs by making their operations more sustainable (OECD 
2018). The ‘circular economy’ can reduce waste and stimulate product innovation, while at the 
same time contributing positively to sustainable human development. It can be an engine for 
economic growth and the creation of new jobs in recycling, rental and repair services, 
remanufacturing, secondary material production and the ‘sharing economy’ (Schroder 2020). 
6.1.3. Digitization and technological change 
The ‘hollowing out’ of middle-skilled jobs in emerging markets risks exacerbating inequality, 
particularly in Africa and South Asia (Meagher 2020). Digitization risks contributing to a ‘two-
speed’ economy: one where already privileged, highly educated and skilled workers are able to 
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reap maximum benefit from high-quality digital employment, and another which keeps workers 
in low-skilled, low-paying jobs (Kazimierczuk 2020). The ‘platform economy’ (economic and 
social activity facilitated by digital platforms) is currently dominated by a few US transnationals 
who evade taxation and hoard wealth offshore, reducing government income while fueling 
austerity and low-wage precarity (Srnicek 2017). Anti-trust legislation, regulation and taxation 
enforcement are policy instruments that could reduce the dominance of platform capitalism and 
open up the potential for platform cooperatives which are owned by local gig-economy workers 
themselves, and for platform collectives established by national governments.  
The landscape is changing rapidly. Interviews with stakeholders were very illuminating in 
showing the pace of change. 
 
Nabeel Youcef, Radical Growth Solutions, Pakistan 
‘I’m an optimist. There are so many work opportunities now. Rural areas in Pakistan are 
increasingly connected to 4G and youth are using mobiles to work remotely, to freelance. 
There are lots of government and private sector programs to train youth in digital literacy, 
but also lots of self-teaching in software development and Adobe Creative so that people 
can work as coders or graphic designers via freelance platforms like Fiverr, even in rural 
areas. This is a new trend just in the last year or 18 months.’ 
Additional analysis should be carried out to look at gendered differences in ICT access and use, 
as well as the challenges for women’s integration in the digital economy. Because the skills 
needed to remain relevant in the workforce are likely to continuously evolve, many people are 
advocating for the widespread institutionalization of lifelong-learning programs or 
retraining/reskilling programs for those who find themselves out of work (S4YE 2018; World 
Bank 2016b, 2019b).  
In some places, such as rural Bangladesh, girls using mobile phones are labelled ‘bad girls’ and 
seen as promiscuous, while boys with phones are simply seen as sociable and connected (Girl 
Effect 2018). In such places social norms discourage girls from using phones, meaning that 
from a young age they are already relatively left behind in the digital experience compared to 
boys. Girls who are exposed to digital technology when they are young are more likely to 
become digitally literate and to take on education and employment opportunities that make 
significant use of technology (S4YE 2018). Work needs to be done to change entrenched views 
about girls and technology held by their parents, other ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g. teachers, religious 
and community leaders) and society at large.  
 
Nabeel Youcef, Radical Growth Solutions, Pakistan  
‘At Radical Growth Solutions we are developing “low-cost” IoT (Internet of Things) remote 
sensing and automatic alerts to improve agricultural yields for smallholders. We are 
developing voice-based notifications too, because illiteracy is high in rural areas. 
Government can do more to bring farming into the twenty-first century. Government needs 
to do its homework before talking about these issues. It needs to focus on education and 
provide youth with literacy, tech skills and knowledge about platform opportunities much 
earlier. Rather than fill up the urban areas, creating unsustainable megacities, we need to 
enable people to grow food profitably. We need to balance technology and nature. We 
need to use technology to augment – not replace – humans.’  
Despite the challenges there is clearly great potential in new technology, and digital 
employment parks in rural areas may be one way of promoting this work. However, 
governments will need to provide an enabling environment, as well as incentives for companies 
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to set up in rural locations and regulation to ensure decent work. Private sector 
telecommunications companies will need to demonstrate commitment to under-served 
communities by providing infrastructure to develop these new markets. Universal Service Funds 
may be appropriate sources of start-up investment – these are funding mechanisms intended to 
serve as a financial motive for operators to provide access to mobile coverage in areas with 
access gaps. While online employment and gig-economy platforms may reach ever greater 
numbers of workers, young and old, they do not necessarily bring with them the benefits, let 
alone the guarantee, of decent work.  
6.1.4. Migration 
Technological change provides the potential to secure foreign jobs and earn foreign exchange 
through online work. As millions of jobs move online, these technological trends could help to 
reduce youth unemployment, decrease rural-to-urban and south-to-north migration, and reduce 
the high CO2 emissions associated with hundreds of millions of migrant-worker journeys every 
year. 
Imtinan Ahmed, Skill Gains Limited, Pakistan 
‘To raise the demand for labor and services, the private sector should highlight the 
importance of supporting rural businesses and “agripreneurs”, making agricultural products 
more profitable and raising overall productivity.  
In addition to that, establishing efficient land-rental markets and youth-oriented savings 
and credit schemes, can help address these gaps. Other recommendations include 
investing in complementary infrastructure, stimulating private sector investment, and 
improving the rural business climate and trade by providing incentives and reducing 
barriers such as local fees and burdensome procedures. Secondary towns, where people 
leaving agricultural work are much more likely to find jobs than in big cities, can be made 
more attractive to youth by increasing access to education, health and recreation.’  
In South Asia, the recent rise of online freelance work has the potential to create rural income 
and reverse migration. The emergence of online digital platforms has introduced the potential 
for young people to secure overseas jobs without leaving their home or family, if internet 
connectivity is available. This option is particularly attractive to university graduates 
experiencing high levels of graduate unemployment.  
At the national level, online digital employment offers the potential for governments to move 
away from exporting millions of workers to generate foreign exchange earnings through 
remittances. Hundreds of millions of workers leave Bangladesh, Pakistan and Ethiopia every 
year to find work in the Global North. Their families and domestic economies are sustained by 
the remittances that they send home. Often the working conditions of migrant workers fall far 
short of decent work standards, while long absences put a strain on marital and parent-child 
relationships. If rural areas had good connectivity and some soft/hard skills support, it would be 
possible to grow online freelance work as a means to create new jobs, bring in foreign 
exchange earnings and increase livelihoods, without contributing to rural-to-urban or overseas 
migration and transport-related CO2 emissions.  
Focusing more resources and investments on secondary towns and intermediary cities can help 
create new markets and job opportunities for rural smallholder farmers and processors, while 
strengthening linkages between rural and urban development (Roberts and Hohmann 2014). 
Addressing potential inequalities in digitized work 
• There is potential to promote rural online work as an alternative to youth 
unemployment, migration and rural poverty. 
• By extending rural connectivity, it is possible for young people to access online work 
without leaving their rural land, homes or families. 
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• It is possible to build on the idea of Free Trade Zones and Agro-Export Processing 
Zones to imagine ‘Rural Online Work Zones’ or centers. 
• Business Outsourcing Processing parks could be established by governments, 
connectivity providers, Universal Access Funds, corporates, venture capital or NGOs. 
• Education institutions could help with the school-to-work transition by introducing 
students to online working and helping students to set up accounts with online 
platforms, such as Fiverr and MTurk, prior to graduation.  
• The government needs to provide an enabling environment, connectivity, training and 
support for online work in rural centers.  
6.2. Policy and power 
If governments want to make progress on addressing the reasons for youth unemployment and 
educational failure, they must implement policies that recognize and address the underlying 
causes of young people’s unequal position in society. It is vital to recognize the limitations of 
youth policies in the face of global inequalities. Oxfam’s research on youth and inequality in 
2016 noted the increase of interest in youth policies, but warned that ‘the existence of a national 
youth policy, while representative of a general increase in government interest in youth issues, 
does not necessarily translate into improved opportunities or participation for youth’ (Glassco 
and Holguin 2016). 
Overall, it is vital to ‘think youth, act structurally’: to act at a larger-scale, society-wide level to lift 
everyone up. Youth are part of families and communities; policies to help rural youth therefore 
need to address the broader issues of a stable and habitable climate and decent jobs for all, not 
just for young people (Glover and Sumberg 2020). 
Debates about what this means for the future of work often revolve around whether the latest 
wave of technological innovation will result in net job losses, and the need to reskill workers to 
meet the future needs of employers. Technology does not predetermine who owns the 
platforms, who designs the tools people use every day or the distribution of benefits. Narratives 
about the future often imply that workers must suffer in the transition. Yet alternatives are 
possible. 
• This research has shown the urgent need for policies that are fit for the future of work for 
rural youth, in the face of rapid changes in our technological, climate and political realities. 
It raises a range of key strategic questions for civil society: 
• How can civil society support freedom of assembly, expression and association to defend 
the online and offline space, in order to protect the interests of marginalized and deprived 
groups, including rural youth and women?  
• How do we convene a society-wide dialogue in which social partners consensually agree 
how new technologies can be incorporated for the common good? 
• How can new technologies be used to enhance workers’ agency and capabilities, safety 
and efficiency? 
• How can the economic benefits generated by digitization be shared in ways that mitigate 
disruption, provide social protection payments and enable retraining for decent work and 
quality jobs? 
• How can we promote ‘just transitions’ to a circular economy, which could promote 
sustainable livelihood opportunities for young people in rural areas? 
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